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"creation" be confined to the activity whereby "an actual occasion comes into 
being from its past and its initial subjective aim, by means of its own decision." 
This definition would exclude God, since God is not an actual occasion. God 
would still be an essential condition for an occasion's self-creation, however, 
through His provision of the occasion's initial aim, and would thus share, in 
some sense, in its creation. Furthermore, is there any sound reason for denying 
that God is "creative," or that a kind of "creation" takes place in God, in both 
His primordial and consequent natures? I hardly think that Ford would make 
such a denial. So the issue still remains confused, at least in my mind. I do not 
believe that I am quibbling; the problem of how best to state God's role in the 
"creation" of an actual entity is of basic importance for the comprehension of 
Whitehead's system. 
This is an extremely provocative book. It gives evidence of years of painstaking 
labor and is most impressive in the ingenuity and general clarity and convincing-
ness of its reasoning. I do not think that Whitehead scholarship will ever be the 
same now that we have it to draw upon as a resource; it could even produce 
something like a "paradigm shift." And yet, Ford is appropriately modest about 
the tentativeness of many of his conclusions and invites his readers to share with 
him in putting his arguments to the test and continuing the program of research 
he has so admirably begun. 
NOTE 
I. Whitehead's philosophical soul-mate, William James, also laid great stress on the idea of 
panautomism in expressing his version of metaphysical pluralism. As James put it in his essay, "The 
Dilemma of Determinism," there is "a certain amount of loose play" of the parts in relation to the 
whole, something in each part "really of its own." See John J. McDermott (ed.) (1977). The Writings 
of William James. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 587-610, pp. 591·593. 
Without Proof or Evidence: Essays of O. K. Bouwsma, edited and with an 
introduction by J. L. Craft and Ronald E. Hustwit, The University of Nebraska 
Press, 1984. pp. xiv, 161. 
Reviewed by PETER V AN INW AGEN, Syracuse University. 
This book is a rather miscellaneous collection of O. K. Bouwsma's writings on 
religious topics. (One of the pieces, an introduction to a collection of Nietzsche's 
letters, is only indirectly connected with religion.) Most of the papers-if that 
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is the word for them-in the book have never been published. All of them are 
worth reading, especially for Bouwsma fans. (But the classic, inimitable 
Bouwsma voice, the voice of "Descartes' Evil Genius" and 'The Terms of 
Ordinary Language Are ... " is heard continuously and at full strength in only 
one of the papers, "Adventure in Verification," wherein an epistemologically 
ambitious Greek climbs Mt. Olympus to verify certain theological propositions. 
The classic voice is muted and is heard only intermittently in the other papers, 
possibly because Bouwsma takes Abraham and Moses and St. Paul, and even 
St. Anselm, more seriously than he takes Descartes or Grover Maxwell.) 
In this book, one meets many of the same thoughts over and over again, 
twisted round one another, unexpectedly combined, and never presented twice 
in exactly the same way. I will concentrate on a few strands in Bouwsma's 
thought that one usually encounters as parts of the same tangle: his treatments 
of faith, defense, proof, evidence, obedience, revelation, and the Bible. 
It is tempting to classify Bouwsma as a "Wittgensteinian fideist": he dislikes 
it when people raise the question whether religious beliefs are objectively true; 
he regards the concepts of "proof' and "evidence" as being wholly irrelevant to 
the life of the religious believer (and by the religious believer he always means 
someone who is a practicing Lutheran or Orthodox Jew or member of some 
other particular denomination); and he locates the tendency to raise questions 
about objective truth, and, a fortiori, questions about proof and evidence, in 
certain mistakes about language. But unlike many who have been called 
Wittgensteinian fideists, he does not ascribe these tendencies to mistakes about 
"religious language," if that means the forms of words that believers use in 
talking with one another ('Pray for my husband'; , ... I have sinned by my 
own fault in thought, word, and deed ... '; 'Depart, 0 Christian soul, out of 
this world ... '). These tendencies, rather, are a consequence of misun-
derstanding the language of Scripture. 
We are like people who live in an enclosure, Bouwsma tells us. In the enclosure 
there are doors (so the inhabitants know about doors), and set in the outer wall 
of the enclosure there are things that look like doors but aren't, dummy doors 
we might call them. A lot of people spend a lot of time rattling the dummy 
doors or trying to pick their dummy locks. Some think that they have opened 
them. Others say that they have seen light through the chinks and cracks around 
the doors. Let us leave them to it. A most important fact is that we-let us say 
'we'--have here with us in the enclosure the Bible. The trouble is that we don't 
know how to read it, or many of us don't. We don't know how to read the Bible 
because the Bible is God talking to us, and we don't know how to listen when 
God talks. The Bible is not (as some evidently suppose) a piece of primitive 
science or a work of fanciful history. It is a promise and a call. It is a promise 
of eternal life in Jesus Christ and a call to faith. It is also a sort of instruction 
BOOK REVIEWS 105 
manual for those who heed God's call and elect a life lived in faith. One of the 
mistakes made by those who do not know how to read the Bible is the idea that 
faith consists primarily in the acceptance of propositions, that faith is simply a 
certain sort of propositional belief. Faith, however, does not consist in propo-
sitional belief, but in obedience. One of the most important aspects of the Bible 
is that it tells us many stories of lives lived in faith. That is the respect in which 
the Bible is an instruction manual for the faithful; it says: faith is like this. The 
faithful whose stories are told in the Bible are just that cloud of witnesses partly 
enumerated in Hebrews 11. Of that cloud of witnesses, Bouwsma particularly 
delights in Abraham and Moses-and that latter-day witness, St. Paul. 
It is rash to try to summari2le Bouwsma's thought, but I am perverse enough 
to try. In a nutshell, his central thesis is that faith is obedience to God, and 
obedience to God logically excludes any search for (or even attention to) proof 
or evidence. Imagine this. The Lord says to Moses, "Go and gather the elders 
of Israel together .... " Moses reasons: "Let's see. The voice called unto me 
out of a bush that burns with fire and is not consumed. Therefore, there is 
probably a God and the voice is probably His, and so I'd probably better do 
what it says." To act on such reasoning would not be obedience. (Perhaps it 
wouldn't be disobedience, but obedience is not the same as non-disobedience.) 
If faith logically excludes any traffic in evidence and proof, can we therefore 
never defend our faith? ("Always be ready with your defense when you are called 
to account for the hope that is in you . . . , "I Peter 3: IS.) Yes, indeed. But for 
the faithful a defense is a confession of faith, a simple series of assertions about 
what God has commanded. The paradigm case is St. Paul's defense of his actions 
before Festus and King Agrippa (Acts 26): 'Then Paul stretched out his hand 
and began his defense ... 'I saw a light from the sky ... ' ... 'Paul, you are 
raving ... ' ... ' ... what I am saying is sober truth'." 
There is much in this that any Christian should agree with. Few Christians, 
if any, would say in so many words that the Christian faith can be proved. It 
has always been an article of that faith that it is a gift. The Christian (there are 
such) who amasses large bodies of evidence to prove to the unbiased inquirer 
that the faith is true or probable or more reasonable than its competitors (including 
atheism and agnosticism) would seem to be an imperfect adherent of that faith. 
Such a Christian is making a mistake. But there are other ways of looking at 
his mistake than Bouwsma's. I myself would say that his mistake was not about 
language but about people. Christians generally believe that we are ruined, 
defaced, twisted creatures; that we have made ourselves so by rebelling against 
God. (Bouwsma calls people who do not yet obey God "wild"-as in wild horses 
[p.IS]. But that is misleading. Wild horses are not in rebellion, either against 
God their maker or us their natural masters.) In particular, our minds and wills 
are twisted. How does a creature of deformed mind and will respond to evidence 
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incompatible with the deformed picture of the world that is consequent on a 
deformed mind and will? We have a model in those whose minds and wills are 
even more twisted than is normal. How does the paranoid respond when shown 
good evidence for the thesis that his colleagues are not conspiring against him? 
How does the Nazi react to an offer to prove that Semitic and Teutonic blood 
cannot (contrary to official Nazi biology) be distinguished under a microscope? 
The questions answer themselves. How would fallen and unregenerate creatures 
react to good evidence that there is a God who acts in history and commands 
them to repent? Christ has answered this question: "If they hear not Moses and 
the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead." 
(Luke 16:31) (In context this means, "though one rose from the dead before 
their very eyes.") A preoccupation with evidence may be unchristian not because 
a desire for evidence is logically incompatible with Christian faith and obedience, 
but because, from a Christian point of view, evidence would be of little practical 
consequence. 
But when Bouwsma deprecates proof in religion, he is not, or not usually, 
thinking of those people who try to prove or render probable the whole of the 
Christian faith. His usual target is those people who offer arguments for the 
existence of God. (Those who attempt to pick the dummy locks on the dummy 
doors.) The project of attempting to prove the existence of God seems to him 
to be incompatible with obedience to God. (Suppose someone in the land of 
Midian had said to Moses, "Careful. You don't want to be taken in. What do 
you know about this voice, anyway?" Suppose Moses had responded with a 
brilliant version of the Ontological Argument. Would this have been a response 
of obedience?) 
Attempts to prove the existence of God, unlike attempts to prove the faith as 
a whole, have been looked upon favorably by many great Christians. I am 
inclined to think that Bouwsma is right to regard a preoccupation with such 
arguments as unchristian, but, again, it seems to me that someone who thinks 
that he does God service by devising them is making a mistake not about language 
but about people. There is, of course, the old and valid point that metaphysical 
reasoning can be followed only by a few, and the related point that, owing to 
the ever-present possibility of discovering a mistake, real or fancied, in a chain 
of metaphysical reasoning, a faith built upon metaphysics is a house built upon 
sand. But if we may trust St. Paul, there is a strong case for regarding metaphysical 
arguments as not only weak but as entirely useless. Unless I misunderstand Paul, 
he tells us that believers and unbelievers alike have available to them something 
much better than arguments for the existence of God, something independent of 
Holy Scripture and only indirectly connected with faith and obedience: 
For that which may be known of God is manifest among men; indeed 
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God himself has made it manifest. The invisible attributes of God, his 
eternal power and deity, have been perceived since the creation of the 
world, being understood through created things. (Romans 1: 19-20) 
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(Incidentally, Bouwsma says [p.143] that there is no such thing as "God in 
general," but only "the God of the Christians," "the God of the Jews," "the God 
of the Muslims," and so on. 1 expect he thought St. Paul would have agreed. 
One wonders how he would rewrite this passage so as to make his and Paul's 
agreement on this point fully explicit.) I interpret Paul as saying that the existence 
and attributes of the invisible God can be seen in His creation much as the 
"invisible" emotions of our fellows can be seen in their faces. But if this is true, 
unbelievers have nevertheless succeeded in convincing themselves that they have 
seen no such thing. Anyone who has been able to do that will have little trouble 
in brushing aside a mere metaphysical argument. A person who really did believe 
that other living, moving human forms were mere unconscious automata could 
not be restored to normality by being taught the analogical argument for the 
existence of other minds. 
Bouwsma's attitude toward faith and evidence, naturally enough, has conse-
quences for his attitude toward revelation and knowledge. He suggests that the 
imparting of propositional knowledge to certain people is "telling secrets," and 
that God's revelation does not involve telling secrets (p .15). Even if we accept 
this tendentious characterization of the imparting of propositional knowledge, 
we shall find scriptural difficulties with this suggestion. (Bouwsma is, after all, 
trying to show us how to read the Scriptures.) One might cite Mark 4: 10-11, 
but this passage is rather a dark saying. Consider instead the famous discourse 
in I Corinthians about the things revealed by the Spirit. Paul begins by telling 
the Corinthians something that Bouwsma's picture of faith and revelation fits 
very well: 
[When 1 was with you] my message and my preaching did not depend 
upon the persuasiveness of human wisdom, but were a demonstration 
of power and the Spirit; and this was so that your faith might not rest 
upon human wisdom but upon the power of God. 
But he goes on to say, 
But we do speak wisdom among those who are fully prepared for 
it ... we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, the secret thing 
that God ordained before the ages for our glory. (1 Corinthians 2:4-7) 
But, in any case, we should not accept Bouwsma's identification of the imparting 
of propositional knowledge with telling secrets. I have learned a great deal about 
the state of my health from my doctor, but he has never, that I can remember, 
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told me a secret. 
I will close by noting that one important aspect of the relation between faith 
and evidence is entirely ignored in these papers. I concede that the papers are 
(as I have said) a miscellaneous collection, and that it would be absurd to fault 
such a collection for failing to be a comprehensive treatment of any topic. Still, 
I think the point is worth remarking on. One finds no mention in these papers 
of the fact that various people have attempted to disprove the beliefs of Christians 
and other theists. Unbelievers have, for example, attempted to demonstrate that 
the existence of God is incompatible with pain and suffering; or that religious 
beliefs are the products of depth-psychological or economic forces; or that 
religious beliefs are incompatible with known scientific fact; or that critical 
studies of central Biblical texts show these texts to be corrupt or historically 
unreliable or to have been intended by their authors in senses that do not support 
the theological superstructure that later generations have raised on them. I cannot 
discover in these papers any suggestion as to how a Christian should respond to 
arguments offered as disproofs of theism or as evidence of the scientific or 
historical untenability of Christian belief. Let me offer a rather extreme example. 
Suppose a Christian is assured by a freethinking acquaintance (who has read it 
in Godless Sunday at Home) that the Gospels were made up out of whole cloth 
by unscrupulous priests circa 400 A.D. Shall he say, "Maybe so, but I still 
intend to regard them as a promise of eternal life and a call to obedience?" No, 
he can't say that. He may, of course, assume that his acquaintance is lying or 
mistaken and put the matter out of his mind. That's all right. One who felt 
obliged to investigate every challenge to his convictions would be hard-pressed 
to find the time to act on his convictions. But if he finds he can't put the matter 
out of his mind, or if it looks to him as if there might really be something to 
his acquaintance's thesis, then it would seem that he must search out evidence 
and evaluate it. 
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Both Turner and Dupre are at home in the large border area that lies between, 
or more correctly is overlapped by, contemporary philosophy and religious 
studies. Both see in the work of Karl Marx, though not in much of what goes 
